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Abstract
Realism is generally assumed as the correct position with regards
to psychological research and the measurement of psychological at-
tributes in psychometrics. Borsboom et al. (2003), for instance, argued
that the choice of a reflective measurement model necessarily implies
a commitment to the existence of psychological constructs as well as a
commitment to the belief that empirical testing of measurement mod-
els can justify their correspondence with real causal structures. Hood
(2013) deemphasized Borsboom et al.’s position and argued that the
choice of a reflective measurement model does not necessarily require
ontological commitments, though, in his view, it does necessitate a
commitment to minimal epistemic realism. Although these arguments
are formulated with regard to psychological research, they can actually
be generalized to other disciplines in social sciences that use similar
methodologies and statistical techniques. In Hood’s opinion, empiri-
cism does not suffice to provide an adequate account of the choice
of reflective measurement models given that this choice requires an
appeal to causal explanations. In this paper, we argue against Hood
and answer this challenge, providing epistemic foundations for social
science research that do not appeal to realism.
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1 Introduction
Realism is an important part of the literature in the philosophy of human
and social sciences, specifically in psychology. Besides various positions one
finds with respect to folk psychology, representations, and mental states (e.g.
Fodor 1980; Jackson and Pettit 1990; Wright 2002), realist arguments can
also be found in the literature on measurement and psychometrics (cf. Michell
1997, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2013; Borsboom et al. 2003; Borsboom 2005, 2008;
Hood 2013).
The predominance of realism with respect to psychological measurement
can be understood in light of the historical context underlying the method-
ological guidelines suggested for the development of measurement instru-
ments. Indeed, realism has been developed in reaction to the operationalist
understanding of measurement models (cf. Waters and Pennington 1938;
Stevens 1939; Bergmann and Spence 1941; Israel and Goldstein 1944; Cron-
bach and Meehl 1955). The operationalist thesis amounts to the claim that
latent traits, represented by latent constructs, only exist through the equa-
tions defining these constructs. One problem with operationalism, however, is
that the idea that latent traits do not exist beyond their statistical definition
is conflicting with the rigorous methodology used to define said traits, which
seems to imply that there are latent traits being measured. Put differently,
it appears that operationalism is not sufficient to provide a rational justifi-
cation of the methodological choices that are made during the development
of measurement instruments. As a result, realism has been presented as an
alternative epistemic standpoint that can rationally explain methodological
decisions in psychological research and, more generally, in social sciences.
In the last decades, there has been a tendency to assume that a realist
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understanding of psychological attributes and measurement models is the
only viable option, and the burden of the proof has been left to anti-realists
to provide an intelligible conception of the methodology used in social sci-
ences. With respect to psychological research, the culmination of the realist
position can be found in the work of Borsboom et al. (2003), who argue
that psychometrics necessarily requires epistemological and ontological re-
alist standpoints. However, Hood (2013) deemphasized that position and
argued that psychometrics only necessitates epistemological realism and, in
this respect, it does not necessarily require ontological commitments.
Hood’s main thesis is dubbed methodological realism, which in turn relies
on the principle of minimal epistemic realism.
Methodological realism The rationality of certain methodological deci-
sions requires a commitment to minimal epistemic realism (Hood 2013, p.741).
Minimal epistemic realism It is, in principle, possible to justify hypotheses
that posit unobservable entities (Hood 2013, p.740).
This position is grounded on Leplin’s (1986; 1997) analysis, who argues
against instrumentalism that realist assumptions are required to justify and
explain methodological decisions in science. Hood (2013, pp.742,759), build-
ing on Leplin’s thesis, argues that this position also holds in psychology:
Methodological choices in psychological research and psychometrics cannot
be conceived as rational under an anti-realist or an empiricist epistemic po-
sition (see also Leplin 1986, p.32).
Hood’s theses can be summarized as follows. First, a rational (or non-
arbitrary) choice to model covariation reflectively rather than formatively
necessitates that researchers are committed to the idea that, in principle, it
is possible to justify the hypothesis that posit the existence of latent traits.
Second, trying to estimate (latent) abilities necessitates that researcher are
committed to the idea that, in principle, it is possible to justify the hypothesis
that there are such (latent) abilities and, further, they are committed to the
existence of such abilities. Third, a rational (or non-arbitrary) choice to
use a longitudinal research design rather than a cross-sectional one to model
within-subject variation necessitates that researchers are committed to the
idea that, in principle, it is possible to justify the hypotheses stipulating the
existence of latent traits.
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Although Hood concentrate on the (alleged) necessity of realism to jus-
tify methodological decisions in psychological research, his arguments can be
generalized to other disciplines in social sciences that use similar methodolo-
gies and statistical techniques, such as sociology, education, or management.
Thus generalized, Hood’s position amounts to the claim that anti-realists and
empiricists cannot provide a rational account of methodological choices made
in social sciences with respect to latent attributes and measurement models.
In what follows, we answer Hood’s challenge and articulate an empiricist
position that can rationally explain methodological decisions made in social
sciences. Given that Hood’s arguments are aiming at psychological research
specifically, we will concentrate on that as well, keeping in mind that our
analysis can be generalized to other disciplines that use similar statistical
techniques. In response to Hood’s thesis, we argue that minimal epistemic
realism is not a necessary epistemic standpoint required to justify method-
ological decisions made with respect to measurement models insofar as it
cannot be defended consistently when there is underdetermination. The ob-
jective is not to establish or deny that researchers are committed to minimal
epistemic realism but is rather to deny that minimal epistemic realism is
necessary to make sense of the non-arbitrariness of psychological research.
Our arguments are grounded on specific examples taken from the scientific
literature, supporting the idea that only methodological empiricism is neces-
sary to justify methodological decisions in psychology and, more generally,
in social sciences.
We begin in section 2 with a summary of Hood’s arguments in favor
of methodological realism as well as Borsboom et al.’s position, on which
Hood’s position partially relies. The thesis defended within this paper, min-
imal epistemic empiricism, is presented in section 3, and Hood’s arguments
are discussed in section 4. In a nutshell, we argue that underdetermina-
tion implies that minimal epistemic realism leads to inconsistent beliefs with
regard to competing statistical models. We conclude in section 5 with a
summary of our analysis.
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2 Minimal epistemic realism
2.1 Measurement models
The core of Hood’s argument regards the (methodological) choice of modeling
latent attribute reflectively rather than formatively. In social sciences, latent
traits (understood broadly as latent characteristics), such as personality traits
(e.g., John and Srivastava 1999) or the satisfaction of psychological needs
(e.g., Deci and Ryan 2008), are formally represented by latent constructs,
otherwise known as latent variables or factors. While empirical phenomena
can be observed, latent traits cannot. Accordingly, claims regarding latent
traits can only be established through statistical inference.
Latent constructs, which are abstract representations of latent traits, are
defined through measurement models. They are measured indirectly via par-
ticipants’ responses to items, which are considered as empirical indicators of
these constructs. An item is a statement within a questionnaire, to which
participants attribute scores. There are various types of items and scales (see
for example Mellenbergh 1994 or Stevens 1946), and a well-known example
would be an item scored on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = completely
disagree to 5 = completely agree.
As there is a distinction to be made between a trait (characteristic) and
a construct (latent variable, factor), there is a distinction between subject
reports (e.g., report of one’s age) and observable traits (e.g., one’s age). Al-
though researchers are trying to establish claims regarding observable and
latent traits, they are rather dealing with subject reports and latent con-
structs.
A measurement model can take either one of two forms (cf. Edwards and
Bagozzi 2000). A formative measurement model considers that the variation
on the latent variable is a consequence of the between-subjects variation in
the items.1 Mathematically speaking, the latent variable is modeled as the
dependent variable, whereas subject reports on items are the independent
variables. Hence, the model is such that subject reports predict the latent
variable. Such a model is then considered as evidence supporting the idea
that a variation on observable traits causes a variation on the latent trait.
A good example of a latent trait modeled formatively would be the socio-
economic status (cf. White 1982). It is defined on the grounds of variables
1See Borsboom et al. (2003) for a discussion of the distinction between inter-subjects
and intra-subject variation.
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including the level of education and income. Formally, a variation on the
construct is modeled as a consequence of the variation on subject reports
on level of education or income. This mathematical abstraction is meant to
represent the idea that different levels of education or income imply different
socio-economic status. That is, the model is meant to represent the idea that
socio-economic status depends on level of education and income. As such,
the trait socio-economic status is conceptualized as an effect of the traits
level of education and income, and this is depicted within a mathematical
model where subject reports of level of education and income predict the
latent variable interpreted as the socio-economic status.
Formative models, however, are not the only kind of measurement models
that are used in psychology. Indeed, some measurement models are meant to
explain the between-subjects variation on items. As an example, consider a
researcher that thinks that some psychological phenomena could be explained
using the notion of the satisfaction of psychological needs, say, the satisfac-
tion of the need for autonomy at work (e.g., Van den Broeck et al. 2010).
Assuming that there is such a thing, how could one measure the satisfac-
tion of the need for autonomy? The researcher might decide to start with a
Likert-type scale in which 1 represents strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 neither
agree nor disagree, 4 agree, and 5 strongly agree. Then, the researcher will
assume that if there is such a latent trait, then one would expect to be able
to observe empirical consequences of this trait. For instance, the researcher
might assume that if a participant’s need for autonomy is satisfied at work,
then one will score high (i.e., 4 or 5) on an item such as “I feel like I can be
myself at my job”.
This is the rationale underlying a reflective measurement model. Re-
searchers postulate that there are latent psychological attributes and try
to indirectly observe them by postulating their plausible observable conse-
quences. In this case, the observable consequence is the between-subjects
variation on the items, and the latent attribute is modeled as a latent vari-
able. A measurement model is said to be reflective when the latent variables
are taken as explanations of the between-subjects variation on the items.
When modeled reflectively, the latent trait is (informally) understood as a
cause that explains the between-subjects variation on the items (cf. Spirtes
et al. 1991, 2000 and Glymour 2001). Items are thus considered as indica-
tors of latent traits insofar as variation on these items is an observable effect
of these hypothesized causes. Mathematically, and in contrast to formative
measurement models, latent traits are modeled as independent variables,
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whereas items are conceived as dependent variables. Consequently, it is the
latent variable that predicts the variation on the items.
Latent constructs and measurement models are identified through the use
of exploratory (EFA) and/or confirmatory (CFA) factor analysis (see Ullman
2013 or Kline 2013; for a more philosophically oriented presentation, see also
Johnson 2016).2 As such, measurement models are special cases of structural
equation models. Without going into the formal details (see Peterson 2018
for further explanations), the basic idea is to model an item as a linear
combination of some factors (i.e., latent variables) in addition to an error
term, which accounts for possible error in measurement. Items are thus
considered as dependent variables which (between-subjects) variation is due
to (i) some independent variables, namely the factors and (ii) error. Hence,
factors are considered as mathematical predictors that explain the between-
subjects variation on the items.
2.2 Borsboom et al.’s position
The starting point of Hood’s argument is Borsboom’s (2005; defended previ-
ously by Borsboom et al. 2003) position that the choice of a reflective model
necessitates an ontological commitment to the existence of psychological at-
tributes and, further, a commitment to the belief that empirical testing of
measurement models can justify their correspondence with real causal struc-
tures (i.e., can justify that measurement models are true). Hood’s summary
of Borsboom’s position is as follows:
The choice to model covariation with a reflective model, as op-
posed to a formative model, requires a commitment to realism.
There is no a priori reason to prefer one model to the other unless
one harbors realist commitments. Without such commitments,
the decision seems arbitrary. Indeed, it would seem irrational to
prefer the model that carries with it ontological commitment if
one does not embrace some form of realism (Hood 2013, p.749).
2Michell (1997, 2005) argues that measurable attributes must have a quantitative struc-
ture and that, since the structure of the measurement unit must be isomorphic to the
structure of the attribute, it follows that psychological attributes, if they are quantitative
at all, cannot be measured by Likert-type scales. See Borsboom and Mellenbergh (2004)
and Hood (2013, 2008) for an analysis of Michell’s position.
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Borsboom et al. (2003) provide three arguments to motivate that position.
The first argument regards the evaluation of a participant’s position on a
latent variable. In their view, realism is entailed by the fact that there is
a probability of error when estimating a participant’s position on a latent
variable: If there is a possibility of mistake, then realism holds since “there
must be something to be wrong about (Borsboom et al. 2003, p.209)”. In this
respect, Borsboom et al.’s position is that measurement necessarily implies
an ontological commitment insofar as one can only measure things that exist.
The second argument relies on the notion of estimation of parameters
and follows the same line of reasoning. In their view, estimation is a realist
concept insofar as only things that are real can be estimated. The argument,
however, goes a step further: Estimation of parameters means estimating
the true value of a parameter.3 When estimating a parameter, one is most
likely to be wrong about it. However, “it is impossible to be wrong if it is not
possible to be right (Borsboom et al. 2003, p.209)”. That being said, being
right or wrong is accomplished with respect to the true value of a parameter.4
Hence, to their mind, estimation requires (i) that there is something to be
estimated (i.e., a realist ontological commitment) and (ii) that estimations
of parameters are true or false (i.e., epistemological and semantical realist
commitments).
Finally, the third argument regards the assumption that there is a true
model, which, according to the aforementioned reasoning, requires a (full-
blown) realist perspective. When researchers develop a measurement model
to represent latent traits, they assume that it is true and then test it. That
is, they assume that the measurement model is adequate, meaning that it
corresponds to an actual state of affairs (Borsboom et al. 2003, p.210). Con-
sequently, in their view, assuming a measurement model that is tested neces-
sitates realist commitments.
3This is an assumption underlying frequentist factor analysis techniques (e.g., using
maximum likelihood extraction). It should be noted, however, that there are Bayesian
foundations for factor analysis that rather use a probability distribution (e.g., Muthe´n
and Asparouhov 2012).
4In their view, realism implies that truth should be understood as correspondence
(Borsboom et al. 2003, p.209). It should be noted, however, that metaphysical realism
does not necessarily imply correspondence truth and, similarly, that correspondence truth
does not necessarily imply metaphysical realism. It can be argued that the semantical and
the ontological issues are independent (e.g., Horwich 1996).
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2.3 Hood’s reply
Hood’s (2013) criticism of Borsboom et al.’s (2003) position is compelling.
As it stands, Borsboom et al.’s (2003) analysis could benefit of more concep-
tual distinctions. Indeed, they treat realism as if it were one unambiguous
philosophical position that necessarily entails specific ontological, semantical
and epistemological claims. In this respect, they fail to address that there are
different aspects of realism. Hood (2013) addresses this issue and starts his
analysis by distinguishing two different aspects of Borsboom et al.’s (2003)
position, namely their ontological and their epistemological realist commit-
ments: On the one hand, they are committed to the existence of latent traits
and, on the other, they are committed to the idea that researchers are justi-
fied to believe in successful theories.
The core of Borsboom et al.’s (2003) argument is that the choice of a
reflective measurement model necessitates a commitment to realism. Hood
(2013, pp.748-51), however, argues that the choice of a reflective measure-
ment model only requires minimal epistemic realism but does not require any
ontological commitment. His (correct) argument refuting that psychometrics
requires ontological commitments can be summarized as follows: Measure-
ment models are hypotheses that can be tested, in which case they
may enjoy more or less empirical support. [...] Proposing a hy-
pothesis does not ipso facto commit one to the existence of the
entities postulated therein. That psychometricians model covari-
ation reflectively while remaining agnostic about the ontological
status of their latent variables is perfectly intelligible (Hood 2013,
p.750).
Hood is perfectly right on this point. This argument addresses Borsboom
et al.’s position that the choice of a reflective measurement model necessitates
ontological commitments and, further, it also addresses their third argument
that postulating a true model necessitates similar engagements.
However, Hood goes a step further, which, in our opinion, is a step too
far. Even though he rejects the necessity of the ontological claim, he argues
in favor of methodological realism by defending that psychometrics requires
a commitment to minimal epistemic realism. His argument is threefold.
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2.3.1 Choosing to model reflectively
First, Hood argues that the choice between a formative and a reflective mea-
surement model requires a commitment to minimal epistemic realism. For
instance, he considers a practical study where the measurement model is
empirically tested through various EFA and CFA techniques (cf. Jensen and
Weng 1994). The aim of Jensen’s and Weng’s (1994) study is to establish the
robustness of the intelligence factor g using various methods. Hood (2013,
p.750) begins by pointing out that “reflective models are hypotheses about
the structure of covariation”, which are also “causal hypotheses about the un-
derlying, i.e., latent, common cause(s) of test behavior” and, as such, “they
are testable against novel data through confirmatory factor analysis”. Hood’s
argument runs as follows:
It would seem to make little sense to be “testing” these mea-
surement models against data if Jensen did not think that there
was the possibility of confirming the g hypothesis. [...] Merely
subjecting such models to a confirmatory factor analysis suggests
that one is aiming to confirm the model, causal relationships,
unobservables, and all. Thus, the selection of models that posit
latent sources of variation and the subsequent testing of those
models, as opposed to models that do not make such empirical
claims about the latent structure of ability give good grounds for
methodological realism (Hood 2013, p.750).
Quoting Jensen and Weng (1994, p.254), Hood (2013, p.751) argues that
minimal epistemic realism is necessary to make sense of the idea that
factor analysis would have little value in research on the nature
of abilities if the discovered factors did not correspond to real
elements or processes, that is, unless they had some reality be-
yond the mathematical manipulations that derived them from a
correlation matrix.
In other words, measurement models are hypotheses regarding the rela-
tionship between latent and observable traits. Hence, by choosing measure-
ment models that postulate causal relationships and by submitting them to
empirical verification via CFA, researchers need to minimally assume that it
is, in principle, possible to justify these hypotheses (which specify the exis-
tence of these latent traits) via empirical data.
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2.3.2 Prediction of abilities
Second, Hood (2013, pp.754-5) argues that the prediction of abilities in psy-
chometrics does not only require a commitment to minimal epistemic realism,
but also requires an ontological commitment to the existence of the attribute.
This argument is in line with Borsboom’s et al. (2003) second argument,
specifying that estimation of parameters requires that (i) there exists a pa-
rameter that is estimated and (ii) estimations are true or false with respect
to the true value of the parameter. In Hood’s (2013, p.755) terms:
If psychometricians did not believe that the attribute in ques-
tion existed, and if they did not further believe that claims about
individual position on the attribute were corrigible, estimation
procedures and attempts to reduce sampling error by giving a di-
verse battery of tests would be a perverse and arbitrary enterprise.
Consequently, estimating ability requires both methodological re-
alism and a commitment to the existence of latent traits.
2.3.3 Longitudinal studies and within-subject variation
The third argument regards the choice to perform longitudinal studies rather
than cross-sectional ones. Specifically, it concerns the choice to model within-
subject variation rather than between-subjects variation on items.5 While a
cross-sectional study uses data gathered at only one time point, longitudinal
studies use data gathered at subsequent time points. The aforementioned
measurement models, obtained using EFA and/or CFA, take place within the
context of cross-sectional studies. These models provide an explanation of
the between-subjects variation on the items.
Some researchers, however, are interested in what is happening at the level
of individuals. That is, they are interested in the within-subject variation
on the items, not the between-subjects variation. To see what happens at
the level of the individual, one needs many measurements at different time
points. Hood (2013, pp.755-8) argues that the (methodological) choice to
model within-subject variation rather than between-subject variation, which
he dubs the idiographic turn, requires a commitment to minimal epistemic
5Longitudinal studies is a rather broad category and it does not necessarily model
within-subject variation. There are longitudinal research designs that concentrate on
between-subjects variation.
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realism. For Hood, choosing a longitudinal design that can be used to explain
what happens at the level of the individual indicates that researchers assume
that the data gathered will provide better evidence to justify the existence
of the traits, which amounts to assert minimal epistemic realism.
Nonetheless, the idiographic turn does not require any ontological com-
mitment, given that postulating hypotheses that posit the existence of latent
traits does not engage researchers to be committed to the existence of these
traits.
3 Minimal epistemic commitments
3.1 Methodological empiricism
In its current formulation, minimal epistemic realism is somewhat ambigu-
ous. It stipulates that it is (in principle) possible to justify hypotheses that
postulate the existence of unobservable entities. Implicit to Hood’s formu-
lation is the idea that empirical data can justify hypotheses (in our case,
statistical models). But what does it mean to say that data can justify a
hypothesis? Although this formulation is widely used in the common lan-
guage, it is actually misleading, notwithstanding that it will have a different
meaning for a realist and an anti-realist. Given that hypotheses are declara-
tive sentences (i.e., which have the potential to be true of false), realists will
tend to understand ‘justifying a hypothesis’ as ‘empirical data can justify
that hypotheses are true’. But this would be misleading given that empirical
data do not justify that hypotheses are true but rather confirm hypotheses.
As we know, confirmation of a hypothesis through empirical data does not
provide a justification that said hypothesis is true. For an anti-realist, to say
that ‘data justify a hypothesis’ will rather mean that data provide support
in favor of the hypothesis. As such, the empirical data give us grounds to
believe that the hypothesis is more or less probable.
Empirical data does provide a justification, but it is not hypotheses that
are subject to justification per se. Rather, epistemic states, such as knowledge
and belief, are subject to justification by empirical data. Although one might
say that data provide support in favor of a hypothesis, this only means that
this empirical data can be presented as a reason that justifies a belief in said
hypothesis. To avoid any ambiguity, we propose to rephrase the thesis of
minimal epistemic realism as follows.
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Minimal epistemic realism It is, in principle, possible to justify the belief
in hypotheses that posit unobservable entities.
Before going further, it is worth discussing how justification is understood
within the context of minimal epistemic realism. The literature that followed
Gettier’s (1963) counterexamples to knowledge understood as justified true
belief provided us with different ways to understand how beliefs are justified.
The weakest form of justification happens when one has reasons or evidence
to support a belief. However, Gettier’s counterexamples showed that this
type of justification is insufficient: Merely having reasons to believe does not
imply that one is indeed justified to believe, for one may believe something
that is actually true but for the wrong reasons. To put it differently, one
might be justified (in this sense) to believe, although the belief, in itself, is
not justified (cf. Ball 2012; Feldman 2004). This example brings to light that
there is a distinction to be made between ‘a person is justified to believe’ and
‘a belief is justified’. While the former implies a doxastic aspect, the latter
is rather a form of propositional justification (see also Turri 2010). To avoid
any ambiguity, let us refer to the first type of justification as weak doxastic
justification. It happens when one possesses evidence that support, to some
degree, a belief, although the belief might turn out to be false after all.
In contrast, propositional justification happens when a belief is supported
by sufficient reasons. In other words, a belief is said to be propositionally
justified when the reasons that support it are sufficient to guarantee its truth.
As such, when a belief is propositionally justified, it is supported by the
‘right’ evidence (cf. Ball 2012; Turri 2010). It is noteworthy, however, that
propositional justification does not imply that one will believe on the grounds
of these sufficient reasons. Indeed, a belief can be propositionally justified,
although one believes it but not for these reasons, or does not believe it at
all. Nonetheless, if a belief is propositionally justified and one believes it
on these grounds, then one will be strongly doxastically justified to believe.
That is, one will believe for the right reasons.
In light of these distinctions, one might wonder which type of justification
Hood had in mind when arguing in favor of minimal epistemic realism. As it
happens, the notion of justification that is implicit to minimal epistemic real-
ism lies in between weak doxastic justification and propositional justification.
Indeed, Hood argues that scientists need to assume that the way they jus-
tify their beliefs might serve as propositional justification, although it might
as well be that scientists are only weakly doxastically justified to believe in
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latent constructs (see Hood 2013, p. 742). In other words, scientists need
to think that it is at least possible that their methodology provides them
with the right reasons to believe, otherwise it would be pointless to use that
methodology. Nonetheless, it is still possible that latent constructs do not
exist, so there is a possibility that the methodology is insufficient to justify
scientists’ beliefs. Given that Hood insists on the idea that it is possible that
the methodology used in human and social sciences provides scientists with
propositional justification, this is how we will understand justification in the
remaining of this paper.
Belief is understood minimally as a KD-modality (cf. Halpern et al.
2009). Thus conceived, a person cannot believe in both a proposition and its
negation (i.e., it is false that one believes in both ϕ and ¬ϕ). That is, beliefs
must be consistent. In contrast to minimal epistemic realism and following
van Fraassen (1980), we propose to adopt the following thesis.
Minimal epistemic empiricism It is, in principle, possible to justify the
belief in the empirical adequacy of hypotheses that posit unobservable enti-
ties.
However, we should keep in mind that we are trying to provide an epis-
temic standpoint that can justify methodological choices rather than beliefs
per se. Methodological choices involve pragmatic elements. In this context,
one should distinguish between acceptance of a theory (or model) and be-
lief. Acceptance of a theory implies using said theory to explain and predict
empirical phenomena. The notion of acceptance captures this pragmatic as-
pect, whereas belief does not necessarily. In the aforementioned formulation
of minimal epistemic empiricism, ‘justifying the belief in a hypothesis’ means
accepting the hypothesis. As such, minimal epistemic empiricism might be
rephrased as follows.
Minimal epistemic empiricism Accepting hypotheses that posit unobserv-
able entities requires a belief in their empirical adequacy.
Methodological empiricism The rationality of certain methodological de-
cisions requires a commitment to minimal epistemic empiricism.
By ‘empirically adequate’, we mean that hypotheses (theories, models,
explanations, etc.) need to be consistent with our observations. That is, they
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need to be “correct, or approximately correct enough (Bhakthavatsalam and
Cartwright 2017, p.446)”. In the case of EFA and CFA (and, more broadly,
structural equation models), the consistency of the model with the data (i.e.,
its empirical adequacy) is evaluated through various goodness-of-fit criteria,
which will be discussed further in section 4.1 below.
3.2 Necessary epistemic attitude
From now on, we will argue that it is the thesis of methodological empiricism
that is adequate for social science research and, further, that it is the principle
of minimal epistemic empiricism that is the minimal assumption required
to make sense of the non-arbitrariness of methodological decisions in social
sciences.
Before going further, it is important to emphasize that endorsing minimal
epistemic realism implies endorsing minimal epistemic empiricism. Empir-
ical adequacy is, among others, one goal of the scientific enterprise. If a
hypothesis h is not empirically adequate, then a belief in h is not warranted.
Put differently, if a belief in h is justified, then h is empirically adequate.
Similarly, if a hypothesis is true, then it is empirically adequate. Now, con-
sider the following principle, which is comparable to Hempel’s (1943) special
consequence condition, stipulating that if some empirical evidence confirms
h, then it also confirms every consequences of h.
Transitivity of justification If a belief in ϕ is justified, then a belief in the
consequences of ϕ is also justified.
Assuming that beliefs are closed under consequence, we can reason as
follows: From the premise ‘if a hypothesis is true, then it is empirically
adequate’, we obtain ‘the belief that a hypothesis is true implies the belief
that it is empirically adequate’. From the transitivity of justification, we thus
obtain that ‘if the belief that a hypothesis is true is justified, then the belief
that it is empirically adequate is justified’. Hence, if one assumes that it is
possible to justify a belief in a hypothesis, then one also assumes that it is
possible to justify a belief in its empirical adequacy.
The minimal assumption that is required by disciplines that use factor
analyses to be non-arbitrary is minimal epistemic empiricism. Put differently,
researchers in social sciences only need to be committed to methodological
empiricism. Researchers need to assume that it is in principle possible to
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justify the belief in the empirical adequacy of reflective measurement models
if the empirical tests of these models are taken as a justification of said belief.
It would be pointless to empirically test measurement models if such tests
could not provide any form of justification whatsoever.
This is quite straightforward and is established by reductio: Assume (i)
that a researcher considers that empirical testing of a measurement model is
taken as a justification of the belief that the measurement model is empirically
adequate but (ii) that it is not possible to justify the belief in the empirical
adequacy of a reflective measurement model. Assuming that possibility and
necessity behave as KT -modalities (cf. Chellas 1980), this is inconsistent.6
That minimal epistemic empiricism is a necessary condition for social
science research can also be seen in light of the rationale behind scientific
reasoning and hypothesis testing. Researchers postulate that some traits can
be used to explain some phenomenon. This does not imply a commitment
to the existence of these traits. Researchers then try to determine how said
traits could be identified. Assuming that there might be such things as
latent traits, one will postulate plausible empirical consequences that such
traits would have. For instance, one might postulate that if a participant’s
need for autonomy is satisfied at work, then one will score high on an item
such as “I feel like I can be myself at my job”. The rationale behind that
conception is that if a participant does indeed score high on this item, then
it will confirm the hypothesis. That is, it will provide support in favor of the
belief in the empirical adequacy of the explanation expressed by the reflective
measurement model. Hence, minimal epistemic empiricism is implicit to the
rationale behind hypothesis testing and confirmation. To paraphrase van
Fraassen (1980, p.12), social science research aims to give us measurement
models which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a measurement
model involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate.
Hood argues that postulating the existence of latent traits does not com-
mit researchers to the existence of these traits. Put differently, assuming that
latent traits might exist does not imply that one is committed to the idea
that they actually do exist. The same argument can be used to argue against
minimal epistemic realism. One can be committed to the idea that it is pos-
sible to justify a belief in a hypothesis’s empirical adequacy while remaining
agnostic regarding whether or not it is possible to justify a belief in a hypoth-
6(i) means that the researcher considers that ‘p’ while (ii) means that she considers
‘¬♦p’.
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esis’s truth. That is, one can be committed to minimal epistemic empiricism
while remaining agnostic with respect to minimal epistemic realism.
As a caveat, it should be noted that we are not proposing that empirical
adequacy is a good substitute for truth.7 Similarly, we are not suggesting that
minimal epistemic empiricism is the actual attitude of researchers. Following
Hood’s argumentation, we are only proposing that believing in the possibility
of justifying a belief in the empirical adequacy of a hypothesis is a necessary
condition for the non-arbitrariness of psychological research and social science
research in general. That is, the only requirement to motivate acceptance of
reflective measurement models is the belief in their empirical adequacy.
4 Answering Hood’s arguments
4.1 Model selection
Choosing to model reflectively because it allows explaining the between-
subjects variation on the items does not require a commitment to the belief
that the data can be used to justify the belief that a hypothesis is true. The
choice of a reflective measurement model is rational insofar as the latent trait,
modeled as a factor, is taken as an explanation of the variation on the items,
and the data gathered provide grounds to justify the belief in the empirical
adequacy of this hypothesis.
One cannot consistently defend that minimal epistemic realism is neces-
sary to justify the choice of a reflective measurement model. Assume that
a researcher is necessarily committed to the belief that data can justify the
belief in a hypothesis’s truth. An important aspect of social science research
is model selection. Various (reflective) measurement models can be used to
model the data. To exemplify our point, let us consider an actual measure-
ment model taken from the literature (cf. Tre´panier et al. 2013). This model
is well-confirmed and is theoretically grounded.
When conducting an EFA, researchers have to choose between models
with different numbers of factors, notwithstanding that they also have to
choose which items will be kept in the final measurement model. Consider
a measurement model aimed at depicting psychological need satisfaction at
work (cf. table 1), a concept proposed by Self-determination theory (Deci
7This have been contested. See, for instance, Leplin (1987, 1997) or Psillos (1999).
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Items
aut1 I often feel like I have to do what I am ordered to.
aut2 If I could, I would do things differently.
aut3 My assignments correspond to what I really want to do.
aut4 I feel free to accomplish my work as I think it should be done.
com1 I feel competent at my job.
com2 I am good at my job.
com3 I understand the tasks that should be accomplished.
com4 I feel like I can accomplish all tasks at work, even the tough ones.
rel1 I don’t feel related to my coworkers.
rel2 I feel like I am part of a group at work.
rel3 I do not interact with others at work.
rel4 I can talk about subjects I find really important with others at work.
Table 1: Items for need satisfaction at work (Van den Broeck et al. 2010)
and Ryan 2008). According to this theory, individuals have three innate psy-
chological needs that must be satisfied to achieve optimal functioning: need
for autonomy (experience of volition and self-endorsement of one’s actions),
need for competence (perception of being able to master one’s environment
and attaining important outcomes within it), and need for relatedness (sense
that one has significant and meaningful interpersonal relationships).8 These
three characteristics are captured through various items, as presented in ta-
ble 1.9 These items are scored on a five-points Likert-type scale ranging from
1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree).
When performing an EFA using these items on a data set with a sample
size of 1200, we obtain the factor loadings presented in table 2.10 The usual
recommendation is to consider factor loadings that are greater than .3 (cf.
Field 2009). That is, only items with factor loading greater than .3 should
be considered as indicators of the factor. However, some authors have sug-
gested that other levels of factor loadings can also be considered significant,
depending on the sample size. For instance, with a sample size of 1200 (as in
our example), one might consider items with factor loadings that are strictly
greater than .162 (cf. Field 2009, p.644).
8See Tre´panier et al. (2013, p.126).
9The scale used in Tre´panier et al. (2013) actually contains more items. For the sake
of this example, we were only provided with part of the scale.
10The analysis was performed using a maximum likelihood extraction as well as a vari-
max rotation. Loadings greater than .3 are in bold, and loadings lesser than .162 have
been omitted.
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Competence Relatedness Autonomy
com1 .844
com2 .891
com3 .557 .172 .183
com4 .595 .222
aut1 .496
aut2 .162 .679
aut3 .191 .167 .648
aut4 .190 .669
rel1 .671
rel2 .790 .206
rel3 .650
rel4 .176 .554 .252
Table 2: EFA for need satisfaction
As we can see, one will obtain two different measurement models depend-
ing on the guideline that is followed. If we follow the usual recommendation
and consider only items with a loading greater than .3, then the factorial
structure is quite clear: com1-com4 are indicators of satisfaction of the need
for competence; aut1-aut4 are indicators of satisfaction of the need for auton-
omy; and rel1-rel4 are indicators of satisfaction of the need for relatedness.
This is a three-factor model containing all items (hypothesis h). However, if
we follow the alternative recommendation and consider all loadings strictly
greater than .162, then we will need to exclude com3-4, aut3-4, and rel2-4
given that items need to load significantly on only one factor (i.e., one wishes
to obtain a simple structure, cf. Thurstone 1947, 1954). This is also a three-
factor model but with only two items per factor (hypothesis h′).11 In light
of these divergent recommendations, there are two different measurement
models to choose from and, as such, there is underdetermination.
Now, consider the case of confirmatory factor analysis. In CFA, the re-
searcher has to specify a priori the measurement model that is to be tested.
She has to specify the number of factors but she also has to specify which
item should load on which factor. These choices have to be justified in light
of competing plausible measurement models. Given the aforementioned ex-
ample, one might want to test both h and h′ in order to see which one is the
best fitting model. The empirical adequacy of a (measurement) model in CFA
11It can be argued that at least three items per factor are required in an adequate
measurement model (cf. Velicer and Jackson 1990). We will consider only two items per
factor for the sake of our example.
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CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR
h .946 .930 .058 .049
h′ .998 .996 .019 .010
Table 3: Goodness-of-fit indexes obtained by CFA
is based on various goodness-of-fit criteria (cf. Kline 2005 or Byrne 2012).
For example, there is the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis
Index (TLI), the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and
the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR).12 CFI, TLI, SRMR
and RMSEA take a value between 0 and 1, and the empirical adequacy of the
model can be evaluated using these fit indices. While CFI and TLI need to
be as close to 1 as possible (x ≥ .9), RMSEA and SRMR need to be closest
to 0 (x ≤ .08).
The results of the CFA performed on the aforementioned data set are pre-
sented in table 3. It is noteworthy that both h and h′ have an acceptable
fit according to all four criteria. Hence, both models are empirically ade-
quate (i.e., they are consistent with the data, as shown by their fit indices).
CFI/TLI might be closest to 1 and RMSEA/SRMR closest to 0 in the case
of h′, but h has a good fit nonetheless. There are a priori no reasons to reject
h in light of the results. Hypotheses h and h′, as explanantia, are not equiv-
alent: They provide different answers to the question regarding why there is
variation in subject reports.13 Nonetheless, they are epistemically equivalent
in the sense that nothing enables us to show the superiority of one over the
other as an explanans.
In both examples involving EFA and CFA, the data provide support for
both hypotheses. Hence, both beliefs in h and h′ are justified. However,
the measurement models are mutually exclusive hypotheses (i.e., h implies
¬h′). Assuming that beliefs are closed under consequence, a belief in h im-
plies a belief in ¬h′. Assuming the transitivity of justification principle, it
follows that if a belief in h is justified, then a belief in ¬h′ is also justified.
Consequently, minimal epistemic realism entails that researchers are justi-
fied to believe that h′ is both true and false, which is absurd. Accordingly,
12See also Browne and Cudeck (1992), Hu and Bentler (1998), Bentler (2007) and Ullman
(2013).
13Although both h and h′ involve a three-factor model, the factors in these models are
defined differently. In h, they are defined via four items, whereas they are defined with
two items in h′. The mathematical definitions are distinct.
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researchers need to deny the necessity of minimal epistemic realism. Put
differently, minimal epistemic realism is not a necessary minimal epistemic
standpoint insofar as it is inconsistent when there is underdetermination, and
there is underdetermination, even in cases of well-confirmed and theoretically
sound models.
In short, one should not assume that the data provide a justification of the
belief in the model’s truth, for this would also justify a belief in the model’s
falsity given that competing models, which may be equally well supported by
the data, are mutually exclusive. This is not a problem for empiricism seeing
that if h is empirically adequate, it does not imply that h′ is not empirically
adequate. A belief in the empirical adequacy of two mutually exclusive hy-
potheses or explanations can be justified via empirical data. Choosing to
model reflectively is not arbitrary if researchers think that data can provide
support in favor of the belief in the empirical adequacy of their hypotheses.
This example brings to light that empirical adequacy is not sufficient to
justify the choice of one hypothesis over the other in structural equation
modeling. In our case, there is underdetermination precisely because both
hypotheses are empirically adequate, which is established by their fit indices.
Hence, one might wonder how to choose between two empirically adequate
hypotheses (models, explanations). As it happens, there is no universal rule
allowing to choose between competing models, and everything depends on
the context. For instance, if one is in the process of building the scale, then
one will prefer the shorter scale for methodological reasons (e.g., one needs to
minimize the time required by participants to fill out questionnaire). There
are also theoretical issues to consider. For instance, it might make sense
conceptually to have a cross-loading between two factors, in which case the
researcher might want to rephrase the item in order to avoid any ambiguity
and tap into only one factor. Similarly, it might be that the cross-loading
is an idiosyncratic property of the sample, in which case it may be ignored.
Besides, there are statistical elements to consider. For example, it is rec-
ommended to have at least three items per factor, so one might want to
prefer h instead of h′. Further, one might want to take into consideration the
balance between complexity and goodness-of-fit, as measured by (among oth-
ers) the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike 1987). Another element
one might take into account is whether the model has been cross-validated
(which is the case in our example). If it has, then, unless one has power
issues, one should keep the entire scale (here, h would be retained). This is
not meant to be an exhaustive list, but is rather meant to exemplify that
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the choice between competing empirically adequate hypotheses depends on
further (pragmatic) criteria that may vary across contexts (see also Peterson
2018). This issue is inherent to model selection and even realists need to
consider these criteria when choosing between competing models.
4.2 Predicting abilities
Following Hood, our objective is not to determine what the epistemic atti-
tude of researchers actually is. Rather, the objective is to determine which
epistemic attitude is necessary to make sense of the non-arbitrariness of psy-
chological research. Hood’s argument in favor of the point that some method-
ological decisions do not require ontological commitments is that postulating
the existence of a latent ability does not require a commitment to said abil-
ity. As it stands, this argument can be applied to Hood’s second argument
regarding the prediction of abilities: When trying to estimate latent abilities
in participants, researchers do not need to be committed to the existence of
these abilities. Rather, they only need to be committed to the possibility
that these abilities exist (cf. Hood 2013, p.754). However, being committed
to the possibility that latent abilities exist does not necessarily imply a com-
mitment to the existence of said abilities. Hence, in contrast to Hood’s and
Borsboom’s et al. positions, trying to predict latent abilities in participants
is devoid of ontological commitments.
Latent abilities may or may not exist. If they do exist, then they might
be identified through specific experiments and be predicted by specific tests.
On the assumption that latent abilities might exist, it is intelligible that re-
searchers try to estimate these abilities, although they might remain agnostic
with respect to whether or not these abilities are actually real. Trying to pre-
dict abilities is not an arbitrary choice as long as researchers think that it
is possible to justify the belief in the empirical adequacy of the hypothesis
specifying the existence of latent abilities.
4.3 Longitudinal studies
A good example of a longitudinal study that can be used to model within-
subject variation is a diary study. In a diary study, researchers will admin-
istrate a short questionnaire repeatedly (e.g., each day of a week, the first
day of each week during one month, each hour within a day, etc.) to par-
ticipants in order to evaluate the within-subject variation on the items (cf.
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Reis and Gable 2000). One way to model this type of data is to perform a
multilevel analysis (cf. Byrne 2012). When performing a multilevel analysis,
one specifies a cluster variable that is used to regroup different measurement
time points and associate them with one entity (e.g., a group, an individual).
Then, one needs to specify a model representing the within-cluster variation
as well as a model for the between-clusters variation. Using this type of
analysis, one can model what is happening within a cluster (or individual),
as well as what happens between clusters.
Underdetermination can also be used to argue against the necessity of
minimal epistemic realism with respect to the choice of performing longi-
tudinal studies that aim to model within-subject variation. As it was the
case in the example presented earlier (cf. section 4.1), it is always possible
to define a scenario where the data provide support for competing hypothe-
ses that are mutually exclusive and theoretically sound. Accordingly, the
argument provided in section 4.1 also applies to longitudinal studies. The
only requirement needed to justify that the choice of longitudinal studies is
not arbitrary is that it will yield data that provide support in favor of the
belief that the hypotheses stipulating the existence of latent attributes are
empirically adequate. Again, there is underdetermination and there will be
mutually exclusive models that will be supported by the data. Therefore,
researchers need to deny the necessity of minimal epistemic realism, other-
wise both beliefs that a model is true and false would be justified. To make
sense of their choice to perform a longitudinal study meant to model within-
subject variation, researchers only need to be committed to methodological
empiricism.
4.4 Underdetermination
It should be emphasized that we are not arguing that minimal epistemic
realism is never warranted. After all, methodological realism only states
that some methodological decisions require an appeal to minimal epistemic
realism to be justified. Rather, we argue that minimal epistemic realism is not
necessary to make sense of specific methodological choices in social science
research. We argue against Hood’s claim that minimal epistemic realism
is necessary to make sense of the non-arbitrariness of i) choosing to model
reflectively, ii) trying to predict abilities, and iii) choosing to use longitudinal
research designs that model within-subject variation. Our analysis relies
on the following underdetermination argument for factor analysis and, more
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generally, structural equation modeling.
Underdetermination argument In cases of underdetermination, being com-
mitted to the idea that data provide a justification of the belief in the hy-
pothesis’ truth leads to an inconsistent epistemic standpoint.
Minimal epistemic realism is neither a minimal or a necessary epistemic
standpoint with respect to factor analysis given the omnipresence of underde-
termination. Being committed to the idea that data provide support in favor
of the belief in a hypothesis’ truth would imply believing that the hypothesis
is both true and false insofar as there are often (if not always) alternative
competing hypotheses that are equally well supported by the data. Thus,
minimal epistemic realism is not a necessary epistemic standpoint regarding
factor analysis seeing that it is inconsistent when there is underdetermina-
tion, and there is underdetermination, even with well-confirmed and theo-
retically sound models. The minimal epistemic attitude researchers need to
have must be able to cope with these cases. Given that minimal epistemic
empiricism covers underdetermination, that minimal epistemic realism does
not, and that minimal epistemic empiricism necessarily follows from minimal
epistemic realism, it follows that only the former deserves to be qualified as
minimal.
Although researchers postulate hypotheses regarding observable and la-
tent traits, they are really dealing with models involving latent variables and
subject reports. Scientific practice does not require to postulate any special
relationship between latent traits and latent variables. The only minimal
epistemic standpoint that is necessary to make sense of the aforementioned
methodological decisions is the idea that acceptance of a theory or model
requires believing in its empirical adequacy.
Incidentally, it is noteworthy that the underdetermination argument im-
plies that propositional justification (see section 3.1) is actually not a suitable
type of justification for minimal epistemic realism. Indeed, the empirical data
and the methodology are not sufficient to guarantee that latent constructs
exist. Again, the fact that a hypothesis is confirmed does not imply it is true:
Confirmation of a hypothesis is not sufficient to guarantee its truth. Conse-
quently, minimal epistemic realism rather needs to be understood in terms of
weak doxastic justification, and this somewhat weaken the claim that min-
imal epistemic realism allows to ensure that human and social sciences are
objective and rational (non-arbitrary) enterprises.
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In contrast, propositional justification is perfectly suitable for minimal
epistemic empiricism. Indeed, the confirmation of a hypothesis does imply
that it is empirically adequate and, as such, it provides sufficient reasons to
believe in the empirical adequacy of said hypothesis.
4.5 Hood’s objection
Concentrating on the first argument, Hood would in all likelihood argue
that empirical adequacy does not suffice to justify the choice of a reflective
measurement model. After all, if Jensen and Weng aim was only
empirical adequacy and not ascertaining the structure of men-
tal ability, the selection of reflective measurement models would
make little sense, as there are available formative models that
also capture the data (Hood 2013, p.750).
The key notion underlying this argument is causality : In Hood’s view,
empirical adequacy does not suffice given that researchers such as Jensen
and Weng aim to ascertain the causal structure of mental ability. As such,
the choice to model reflectively is motivated by the fact that researchers aim
to provide causal explanations.
Accordingly, the real challenge seems to determine how one could moti-
vate the choice of a reflective measurement model over a formative model if
the aim is not to uncover the true causal structure underlying the psychologi-
cal phenomenon under study but is rather to be solely ‘empirically adequate’.
That is, a causal hypothesis is a hypothesis about the real structure of the
world, so if one wants to explain the between-subjects variation on items
through a latent variable, then one needs to assume that it is possible to
justify this causal hypothesis, hence minimal epistemic realism needs to be
assumed. The only way to rationally justify the choice of a reflective mea-
surement model would be to appeal to the causal structure of psychological
phenomena. The reflective model is chosen because the factors are taken as
causal explanation of the between-subjects variation on the items (cf. Hood
2013, p.749).
It is noteworthy that this idea, namely that causal explanation is related
to the physical structure of the world, is implicit within the philosophy of
science literature on psychology (cf. Borsboom et al. 2003, pp.208-9, 2004,
pp.1061-4; Michell 2005, p.289; Hood 2013, p.749).14 On this subject, Wright
14See also Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) as well as Craver and Bechtel (2007).
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writes that if one wants to avoid realism in psychology, one needs to address
the presupposition that
the causality of ordinary psychological explanations requires their
hypotheses to carry a content that already puts them out of the
running for minimalist construal: that there is an objective and at
bottom wholly physical causal order in the world and that once
a discourse ventures causal claims, it must be entered into the
competition for correct depiction of aspects of this causal order
and sink or swim accordingly (Wright 2002, p.220).
Therefore, the biggest challenge one faces when trying to untangle the
epistemic assumptions underlying psychological research from an empiricist
perspective seems to be to provide an account of explanation without ap-
pealing to minimal epistemic realism or causality.
Let us start from minimal epistemic empiricism. Hood would ask: How
could one rationally justify the choice of a reflective measurement model? The
answer to that question is that the choice of a reflective measurement model
is justified via the rationale behind scientific inference and hypothesis testing:
Factors are assumed as explanations of the between-subjects variation on the
items. The researcher, however, only needs to assume that it is possible to
justify the belief in the empirical adequacy of the model. There is no need
to assume that it is possible to justify the belief in its truth.
Hood would then reply: By assuming that factors can explain the between-
subjects variation on the items, researchers are making causal claims and,
thus, they at least need to be committed to the idea that it is possible to
justify (beliefs in) these claims. Empirical adequacy does not suffice because
they are aiming at causal structures. Causal structures are inherent proper-
ties of reality. If researchers postulate a causal structure, they need to assume
minimally that the causal structure is the appropriate one. In other words,
they need to assume that it corresponds to reality or, similarly, that the
claim about the causal structure is true. Hence, empirical adequacy does not
suffice to justify the choice of the reflective measurement model, researchers
need truth.
4.6 Answering Hood’s objection
Explanations in science are generally understood as causal explanations (e.g.
Woodward 2003; Strevens 2008). Given the choice between a causal and
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a non-causal explanation, Hood might argue that the fact that researchers
elected for the causal explanation (that involves mathematics) indicates a
commitment to minimal epistemic realism. But this choice is idiosyncratic
and is not necessary to make sense of the choice to model reflectively.15
Without going as far as to argue in favor of a non-causal account of the
explanatory power of factor analysis (cf. Lange 2013, Skow 2014), it can
be argued that postulating that researchers are trying to establish claims
regarding the causal structure of psychological phenomenon is an unnecessary
assumption.
Recall the distinction between observable/latent traits and subject re-
ports/latent constructs. Only traits can have causes or effects. When ap-
pealing to latent traits to provide causal explanations, one is not in the realm
of factor analysis. Reflective measurement models are meant to provide sup-
port in favor of the belief (in the empirical adequacy of the hypothesis) that
latent traits can causally explain empirical phenomena. Appealing to causal
explanations is unnecessary with respect to the choice to model reflectively.
As it stands, one only needs a minimal (pragmatic) account of explanation.
Scientific theories in social sciences have pragmatic and empirical aspects. As
such, an explanation can simply be understood as an empirically adequate
answer to a why question, and this answer can as well involve mathematics
(cf. Baker 2005). It does not require any claim regarding what structure in
the world brings about the phenomenon. Accepting a measurement model
as an explanation that involves mathematics only requires a belief in its em-
pirical adequacy.
As we mentioned earlier, empirical adequacy does not suffice to moti-
vate the choice between two competing empirically adequate explanations in
structural equation modeling. There are external elements to consider (e.g.,
theoretical, statistical, methodological, etc.), and the pragmatic aspect of
these elements will be evaluated differently depending on the situation. As
van Fraassen (1980, p.13) argued, realists tend to attribute an objective va-
lidity to explanations, an objective validity that anti-realists simply cannot
grant. But realists should agree that explanations are empirically adequate
answers to why questions, and that there are pragmatic elements to consider
when evaluating competing explanations. Only this conception is necessary
15An operationalist, for instance, might accept the notion of a distinctively mathematical
explanation (cf. Lange 2013), in which case the explanation of the between-subjects vari-
ation on the items, which is an empirical phenomenon, would rely solely on the statistical
model provided by the analysis.
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to make sense of the choice to model reflectively.
Besides, even if one assumes that latent traits can causally explain em-
pirical phenomena, this does not imply a commitment to minimal epistemic
realism. Even under this assumption, it follows from the underdetermination
argument that assuming minimal epistemic realism will lead to an inconsis-
tent epistemic standpoint. As such, minimal epistemic realism does not hold
in this context and, therefore, it does not follow from endorsing a causal
account of explanation (at the level of traits).
5 Closing remarks
To conclude, we provided an empiricist account of methodological choices in
social science research, thus answering the challenge raised by philosophers
such as Hood, Leplin and Boorsboom et al. We argued against Hood’s claim
that minimal epistemic realism is necessary to rationally justify the choices
to i) model reflectively, ii) trying to predict abilities, and iii) perform longitu-
dinal research designs meant to model within-subject variation. We argued
that the issue of model selection and, incidentally, underdetermination in so-
cial science research, give us grounds to reject Hood’s thesis. Following van
Fraassen, we defended the thesis of methodological empiricism and argued in
favor of the necessity of minimal epistemic empiricism to make sense of the
non-arbitrariness of methodological choices in social sciences that use struc-
tural equation modeling: Acceptance of a model only requires, as belief, that
it is empirically adequate.
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